Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo)
Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo)'s revenue rose 0.6% to $319 million in fiscal 2026. Its operating margin was −12.3%, up from −18.7% a year earlier. Free cash flow was −$2 million. The diluted share count rose 6.5%.
Operating margin is operating income as a share of revenue. Free cash flow is cash from operations minus capital spending. Return on equity is net income as a share of shareholders' equity. Market cap is the last closing share price times the latest diluted share count, so it is approximate. P/E is the last close divided by diluted earnings per share over the last four quarters, or the latest fiscal year where the quarters aren't available; there is none when the company made a loss.
Charts show fiscal years, from the 10-K filings.
What Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo) does
Huckleberry.ai, which its annual report calls Domo, sells a cloud-based data and AI platform to businesses. Customers use it to pull data from across the company, prepare and organize it, analyze and display it in dashboards, automate tasks, and build apps. It also includes AI features that can generate insights and trigger alerts, run within the customer's own permission and governance controls.
The platform works on top of cloud data systems such as Snowflake, Databricks and Google BigQuery, and it has more than 1,000 connectors to other data sources. Domo says customers can adopt it piece by piece, and that it combines tools that often come from several separate vendors. As of January 31, 2026, it had more than 2,400 organizations as customers.
Customers pay for subscriptions, and the company recognizes that revenue evenly over each subscription's term. It sells to large organizations through long sales cycles, and it sells outside the United States, where some customers pay in other currencies. It has a credit facility with restrictive covenants.
Its biggest risks, as it describes them
- It has a history of losses and may not reach profitability.
- It must manage its growth and may not be able to raise the capital it needs.
- Subscription revenue is recognized over time, so near-term sales changes show up in results only slowly.
- Long, costly and uncertain sales cycles with large customers.
- Its credit facility has restrictive and financial covenants that limit its flexibility.
Income statement
Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo) lost money in fiscal 2026: a net loss of $59 million.
Returns on capital
Balance sheet
Five years at a glance
| Fiscal year end | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and short-term investments | 84 | 66 | 61 | 45 | 43 |
| Debt incl. finance leases | 104 | 109 | 114 | 118 | 126 |
| Net debt (negative means net cash) | 20 | 42 | 53 | 72 | 84 |
| Net debt to EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt to equity | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest coverage | −12.4x | −9.8x | −4.4x | −4.9x | −3.9x |
| Current ratio | 0.7x | 0.7x | 0.7x | 0.6x | 0.6x |
| Quick ratio | 0.7x | 0.7x | 0.7x | 0.6x | 0.6x |
Cash flow
Projections
Project Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo)'s revenue, net income and earnings per share five years ahead in a bull, a base and a bear case with your own figures, and see the share prices your P/E estimates give them, or value it with a discounted cash flow model. Every projected figure is yours: it is not a forecast of ours.
Insider trades
No officer, director or 10% owner of Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo) reported buying or selling its shares on the open market between November 7, 2025 and November 6, 2026.
Indicators
Four widely used measures, worked out from the company's filings. The cutoffs are the ones their authors or users go by, not a verdict of ours.
| Indicator | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Piotroski F-score | 5 of 9 | 2 of 9 | 6 of 9 |
| Rule of 40 | 0.5% | −6.4% | −0.1% |
| Altman Z'' | −24.81 | −28.43 | −26.27 |
| Accruals ratio | −33.4% | −33.1% | −29.9% |
The nine F-score tests
| Test | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net income is positive | Fail | Fail | Fail |
| Cash from operations is positive | Pass | Fail | Pass |
| Return on assets rose | Pass | Fail | Pass |
| Cash from operations exceeds net income | Pass | Pass | Pass |
| Debt fell relative to assets | Fail | Fail | Fail |
| Current ratio rose | Fail | Fail | Pass |
| Share count didn't rise | Fail | Fail | Fail |
| Gross margin rose | Pass | Fail | Pass |
| Revenue rose relative to assets | Pass | Pass | Pass |
| F-score | 5 of 9 | 2 of 9 | 6 of 9 |
Compare
Put Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo) side by side with any other company we cover: revenue, growth, margins, cash flow and returns, with ten years of charts.
Similar companies
| Company | Year | Revenue growth | Operating margin | Free cash flow margin | Return on capital | Net debt to EBITDA | F-score | Compare |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Huckleberry.ai (formerly Domo) | FY26 | 0.6% | −12.3% | −0.6% | — | — | 6 | |
| Agilysys | FY26 | 15.8% | 13.5% | 21.3% | 16.1% | −2.2x | 7 | Compare |
| Commerce.com | FY25 | 2.8% | −4.7% | 4.9% | −20.2% | — | 6 | Compare |
| Amplitude | FY25 | 14.7% | — | 8.2% | — | — | — | Compare |
| Viant Technology | FY25 | 19.0% | 3.5% | 15.0% | 14.5% | −6.2x | 6 | Compare |
10 years of figures
| Fiscal year | FY17 | FY18 | FY19 | FY20 | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| Revenue | 74 | 108 | 142 | 173 | 210 | 258 | 309 | 319 | 317 | 319 |
| Revenue growth | — | 45.6% | 31.3% | 21.7% | 21.2% | 22.7% | 19.6% | 3.4% | −0.6% | 0.6% |
| Gross profit | 41 | 64 | 93 | 118 | 153 | 191 | 236 | 244 | 236 | 239 |
| Research and development | 76 | 78 | 76 | 69 | 66 | 81 | 95 | 85 | 88 | 77 |
| Operating income | −183 | −176 | −144 | −115 | −73 | −88 | −89 | −55 | −59 | −39 |
| Net income | −183 | −177 | −154 | −126 | −85 | −102 | −106 | −76 | −82 | −59 |
| Diluted EPS (US$) | −124.90 | −110.70 | −9.43 | −4.57 | −2.89 | −3.19 | −3.10 | −2.10 | −2.13 | −1.45 |
| Diluted shares (millions) | 2 | 2 | 16 | 28 | 29 | 32 | 34 | 36 | 38 | 41 |
| Cash flow | ||||||||||
| Cash from operations | −144 | −149 | −131 | −80 | −16 | 0 | −11 | 3 | −9 | 8 |
| Capital expenditure | 12 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 10 |
| Free cash flow | −156 | −156 | −138 | −87 | −22 | −6 | −19 | −9 | −18 | −2 |
| Dividends paid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share buybacks | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Acquisitions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stock-based compensation | 9 | 9 | 22 | 24 | 34 | 60 | 84 | 64 | 59 | 56 |
| Balance sheet at fiscal year end | ||||||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | 69 | 62 | 177 | 99 | 91 | 84 | 66 | 61 | 45 | 43 |
| Debt incl. finance leases | — | 46 | 97 | 101 | 100 | 104 | 109 | 114 | 118 | 126 |
| Total assets | — | 155 | 293 | 217 | 216 | 245 | 242 | 226 | 214 | 236 |
| Total liabilities | — | 184 | 248 | 266 | 300 | 371 | 388 | 379 | 392 | 422 |
| Shareholders' equity | −556 | −722 | 44 | −49 | −84 | −126 | −146 | −154 | −177 | −186 |
| Margins and ratios | ||||||||||
| Gross margin | 55.5% | 58.6% | 65.2% | 67.7% | 73.0% | 74.0% | 76.3% | 76.3% | 74.5% | 75.0% |
| Operating margin | −245.3% | −162.0% | −101.1% | −66.5% | −34.8% | −34.3% | −28.8% | −17.2% | −18.7% | −12.3% |
| Net margin | −245.7% | −162.7% | −108.3% | −72.5% | −40.3% | −39.6% | −34.2% | −23.7% | −25.8% | −18.6% |
| Free cash flow margin | −209.0% | −143.7% | −96.7% | −50.0% | −10.3% | −2.4% | −6.1% | −2.9% | −5.8% | −0.6% |
| Rule of 40 (growth + FCF margin) | — | −98.1% | −65.4% | −28.3% | 10.9% | 20.4% | 13.5% | 0.5% | −6.4% | −0.1% |
| Return on capital | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Return on equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Return on assets | — | — | −68.9% | −49.3% | −39.1% | −44.3% | −43.4% | −32.3% | −37.2% | −26.4% |
| Net debt to EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |